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a complicated political situation to offer us a welcome addition to this
series of monographs on international crises and the role of law."
T. R. Schuck
MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: A STUDY oF FINANCIAL POL-
icy. By Sidney M. Robbins' and Robert B. Stobaugh.2 New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1973. Pp. xiv, 23i. $ii.oo
Money in the Multinational Enterprise is the third volume to appear
in the Harvard Business School series on the multinational enterprise,
the best known being Raymond Vernon's Sovereignty at Bay. In these
days of considerable concern' with the impact upon the international
economic system - and national monetary management - of short
term flows resulting from multinational enterprise maneuvers,4 one
would imagine that a book with such an intriguing title as Money in
the Multinational Enterprise would bare all the secrets of how the mul-
tinationals play the international money markets and how the clever
treasurers stage bear raids on the limping pound or dollar or leap on
the performance bandwagon of the mark. In short, one expects to be
told the story of how the multinationals profit from money as a com-
modity, just as the Russians have been clever about wheat and, more
recently, sugar. On the contrary, Messrs. Robbins and Stobaugh have
managed to write a study of management of the financial function in
their sample of 187 multinational enterprises, including one chapter spe-
cifically describing their subjects' efforts to avoid loss through deprecia-
tion (as measured in dollar terms) in the value of foreign currency
assets because of devaluation of those currencies (or loss where the
8. Concluding comments by Professors Louis Henkin of the Columbia University
School of Law, Edwin C. Hoyt of the University of New Mexico, and Hans A. Linde
of the University of Oregon School of Law are appended to the study.
s. Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.
2. Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
3. In the course of the Senate hearings on the amendatory legislation necessary to
change the par value of the dollar in terms of gold, Senator Proxmire queried the then
Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs on the role of multinational
corporations in short-term money flows and received the answer that no data were
available. Hearings on S. 929 before the Senate Committee on BanAing, Housing and
Urban Aflairs, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1973). The result was legislation directing the
Treasury to require multinational corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to submit reports of foreign currency transactions. Pub. L. No. 93-HO. The
Treasury issued proposed reporting requirements on June 27, 1974, 39 FED. REO.
23830-23844 (974), but, except for banks, has not as of this writing issued final ones.
In large part, Senator Proxmire's questions will not be answered by the information
that the proposed reports will elicit.
4. See L. KRAUSE, THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc SySTEM AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION (1972).
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enterprise is a debtor in a currency gone up), without once suggesting
that their subjects ever do anything so crass as to speculate in currencies
for gain. Indeed, they note that for the multinational enterprise as rep-
resented by their sample, "the fear of loss from devaluations or revalua-
tions abroad has always been more important as a governor of action
than the hope of gain from devaluations and revaluations" (p. ii9).
Why? One reason is said to be that the accountants will insist on
showing such a loss on the books, but accounting principles do not per-
mit reporting certain types of gain unless offset by a loss. Also, as the
authors note, governments are less likely to frown upon a firm's pro-
tecting against a loss than a firm's deliberately trying to profit from
movements in exchange rates. Therefore, the strategy described by the
firms in interviews as that followed by them in their transnational finan-
cial planning has been to reduce exchange loss as much as possible. The
authors accept this description of the aim of the maneuvers described
and have entitled the chapter describing the procedures utilized by the
firms to achieve this aim, "Protecting against Exchange Risks."
It should be noted that this chapter describing the firm's strategies
to deal with shifting currency values is only one chapter of ten. The
structure of the book is a double one: the authors counterpoise the
description of how the firms studied finance their foreign affiliates, with-
draw funds from abroad, and deal with the possibilities inherent in cur-
rency value changes,' with a description of the results achieved -with
maximization of profits as the optimal result -by choice of manipula-
tion of financial links through use of their simulation model. Appendix
B to the book describes the model. The authors establish a relatively
simple paradigm of a parent company with two subsidiaries, each unit
located in a different country with varying economic environments
including devaluations of the currency in the two subsidiary coun-
tries. The model was prepared to accord with the international mone-
tary system of fixed rates with episodes of devaluations and revalua-
tions of individual currencies, rather than with the present regime of
floating rates. Nevertheless, the model is so constructed that anticipa-
tion of the market direction of a currency can be built into it as easily
as the three devaluations that the authors inserted.
The model is equipped with all of the possibilities for manipulation
of financial links in the system that the authors found used by the most
sophisticated companies.6 These include the adjustment of transfer
5. For a description of these financial procedures (and their presumed effects) from
quite another normative viewpoint, see the recent two-part article. Barnet and Muller,
A Reporter at Large, Global Reach, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 2 and 9, 1974, at 53-128
and 104-159.
6. For the person trained in law, one of the most interesting points of the book is
the extent to which the sophisticated companies shift the characterization of the financial
linkages to maximize flexibility in the transfer of funds. Funds can go into a subsidiary
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prices, credit on receivables, short-term loans, long-term loans, royalties,
management fees, and timing of dividends. Other than a set of tax re-
sults, there is a minimum of governmental constraints. The model evi-
dendy lives in a world where its governing jurisdictions believe that
maximization of profits for the parent company will redound to the ul-
timate benefit of all.
Lo and behold, of all the financial practices tried on the model, it
develops that the various maneuvers employed to minimize loss on
exchange risk (shifting of funds throughout the multinational system
to find the moment's currency value catbird seat) are the same ones that
maximize profits for the model by producing an exchange profit of $53
million. In analyzing the cause of maximization of profits when uti-
lizing an "optimal policy" in the model, the authors refer tactfully to
the "system's ability to take advantage of currency relations" (p. 166).
In short, effective centralized planning by multinationals aims for gains
through currency value changes, and the simulation model is the tool
for this planning7 Spokesmen for such enterprises say that the mone-
tary policies of the companies are defensive, while the lobbyists for
regulation will talk of currency speculation. As the authors, who have
studied the policies and prepared a model for their "optimal" use,
admit in their final chapter:
Large-scale short-term flights of capital ordinarily come about be-
cause of expected currency devaluations or revaluations rather than
interest-rate arbitrage. When such movements occur, it is extremely
difficult to ascertain with assurance the proportion attributable to
so-called currency speculation and that attributable to the defensive
efforts of multinational firms securing protection for the purchas-
ing power of their liquid assets. [p. 182]
To be fair to the authors, they are well aware of the possible impact
of their model upon the world community. Whether the aim is de-
in another country as debt, equity, or as the authors point out, longer than usual credit
on receivables; they can come out dressed as dividends, repayment of debt or interest
on trade credit -or simply as higher prices on goods sold to the subsidiary (so-called
"transfer pricing"). One is reminded of the bad old days before article IX of the U.C.C.
in which one had a whole choice of possible structures for a security interest with the
optimal decision depending on the variables of the legal and tax environment of the
jurisdiction. A simulation model of this sort would have been useful -and presumably
would be in any area of the law where formalism still reigns supreme.
7. This tool is much more than an academic exercise. Chemical Bank of New York
is presently advertising its "Foreign Exchange Advisory Service" ("helping the multi-
national corporation to manage foreign exchange exposure better"). The service includes
use of two computer models: STRATSIM (Strategy Simulator) to evaluate "your world-
wide currency exposure, analyse tax effects and permit you to test strategies for periods
up to one year to modify your positions" and ALTDET (Alternative Debt Evaluator) to
"analyse borrowing and capital budgeting alternatives in the multinational currency
environment." This material is available on distribution from Chemical Bank.
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fensive or offensive (in the sense of taking advantage of currency rela-
tions), "there is evidence that the policies of multinational enterprises
have the potential of bringing about major adjustments in balance-of-
payments relationships" (p. i8o). They foresee that "Sooner or later,
government action will severely limit the multinational enterprise's use
of credit tools in shuttling funds throughout its system; thus the enter-
prises will be shackled in their ability to protect against currency
changes" (p. i86). The authors do not deplore this result so long as
"all multinational enterprises are faced with the same rules . .." They
note that then the managers can "concentrate on using their other com-
petitive weapons, such as marketing and technology, which were the
basic reasons for their foreign investments in the first place" (p. 187).
Unfortunately, while Money in the Multinational Enterprise offers a
model for centralized planning for the use of credit tools to maximize
the profits of the parent enterprise, it does not offer any prescription'
for the optimal program of government action to limit the use of these
tools in the interest of the world community.' To the contrary, the
authors write with a curious air of neutrality: describing how one pres-
ently plays the game, giving a model by which one can improve his
playing, and expressing their expectation that because the game has
wide-ranging social effects' ° the government will eventually change the
rules of the game. Thus, while the morally neutral approach is no
longer in fashion at the law schools, it is apparently still an approved
mode in schools of business administration. Don't judge the game,
just teach others to play it well. Or perhaps again this is unfair to the
authors. The curious tone of the book may be caused simply by their
recognition that the game as it is played is only a game, and that the
goal, maximization of profits of the enterprise as measured by account-
ing concepts, is itself unreal, or at least bears no necessary relation to
economic gains and losses."
Chapter two contains a small number of pages (six) on the concept
of exchange loss in which the authors explain the difference between
conversion loss and translation loss 2 and explain in addition that both
8. The authors, of course, may believe that optimality and regulation are incon-
gruous.
9. The case that the governmental side could use some help has recently been pre-
sented in an excellent article by Professor Muller. Muller, National Instability and
Global Corporations: Must They Grow Together? ii Bus. AND Soc. REv. 61 (974).
so. See note 5, supra.
ii. For the peculiar effects of accounting principles in the operation of securities laws,
see Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1151 (970).
12. This portion of the book would be very helpful to the practitioner or scholar
preparing to dip into the mysteries of the United States Internal Revenue Code and
exchange gains and losses. See D. RAVENSCROFT, TAXATIoN AND FOREIGN CURRENCY
(1973).
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are measured by a process (the accountant's measurement of devalua-
tion losses and gains) that "has a fundamental flaw in that it deviates
from economic values .... Yet, when a devaluation occurs, accounting
methods ... usually result in the reporting of a loss in the consolidated
statements of the parent, even if no actual loss has occurred or is to be
expected" (p. 25). They point out, for example, that in economic terms,
a devaluation might cause profits of other members of the enterprise
system to rise because of increased transactions with the subsidiary in
the country with the devalued currency. Nevertheless, the policies
adopted by the multinationals to avoid exchange loss are policies aimed
at the accounting losses or gains rather than economic losses or gains.
The authors note:
True, some executives realize that only by chance does the economic
gain or loss equal the gain or loss reported by accountants, but they
still feel the need to minimize those reported losses because of their
possible effect on the stock market. For these executives feel that
players in the stock market look upon accounting losses as economic
losses. But other executives believe that the accounting rules
measure the economic losses, which obviously should be mini-
mized. [p. 26]
The policies adopted to minimize losses or maximize gains have very
real, if presently nonquantifiable, economic effects, culminating in vio-
lently fluctuating short-term capital flows. The authors know that the
multinational ideology, i.e., the belief on the part of executives that the
accounting rules measure the economic losses (or gains), results in the
adoption of policies that do have real effects; and they confidently ex-
pect that the governments will take steps to "shackle" the execution of
those policies. Unfortunately, by never reminding their readers after
the preliminary chapter that their model's gains are also only account-
ing gains, they reinforce the ideology. To the extent, therefore, that
being shackled requires the cooperation of the shackled, the authors
decrease the likelihood of government successfully changing the rules
of the game in the near future.
Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein*
Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
